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Abstract 
A common claim in both the public and academic debate is that a tradable emission permits scheme 
does not provide sufficient incentives for R&D investments. The present paper addresses R&D 
investments and penetration rates of new technology focusing on the specific characteristics of a 
tradable permits market. It is showed that a complex dependency between the emissions cap, the 
market price for emission permits, the price for technology once it is developed and the R&D 
investment decision add an additional layer to the ‘traditional’ market failures associated with R&D. 
Even though the cap and how it is calibrated in response to the introduction of new technology is 
shown to be of importance both for the level of R&D investment and the technology’s penetration 
rate, we argue that the policy maker’s ability to use the cap to counter market failures in the R&D 
stage is limited. This is due to a dynamic inconsistency problem where the policy maker is unable to 
credibly commit to a future policy that is more stringent than motivated by efficiency concerns given 
the then existing technology. Such a policy may not be stringent enough to cover the necessary R&D 
investments. 
JEL classifications; L51, O31, Q55, Q58 




The use of economic instruments to regulate emissions has gained widespread acceptance and 
popularity over the last decades. They have been subject to extensive discussions both in the 
academic and public debate, not least in the wake of climate change having evolved into a 
major policy issue. A claim in the debate is that there is a great need for technological change 
if the climate targets are to be reached, see e.g., Barret (2009). Another claim is that even if a 
cap-and-trade approach will establish a price for emissions and thereby creates incentives for 
technological change, this will not be enough. That is, there is a need for additional policy 
instruments in order to spur the required research and development (R&D). The second claim, 
which will be addressed in this paper, is in a way obvious. Conventional wisdom suggests that 
usually more than one policy instrument is needed to remedy a situation characterized by 
more than one market failure. In the climate policy case the cap-and-trade regime primarily 
targets the externality of greenhouse gas emissions. That the market generally provides less 
than the socially desirable amount of R&D follows from other market failures typically 
associated with knowledge having public goods characteristics so the full benefit of the R&D 
is not appropriable to the innovating party. This is often referred to as spill-over. 
Spill-over is a feature of basically all R&D, not just in that targeting markets regulated by a 
tradable permit scheme. However, a cap-and-trade regime in some sense creates an artificial 
market that differs from ‘normal’ markets as the demand for emission permits directly 
depends on political decisions. The question addressed in the paper is thus; does a cap-and-
trade regime introduce additional problems from a technological change perspective as 
compared to a ‘normal’ market?  
There is a vast literature on endogenous technological change (ETC) in general and induced 
technological change (ITC) in particular, i.e., technological change following from, in this 
case, policies aimed at mitigating global warming. We will not review this literature here as 
there are several studies containing comprehensive surveys, e.g., Gillingham et.al. (2008), 
Fisher and Newell (2007), Wing (2006), Gerlagh and Wise (2005), Jaffe et.al. (2005), Löschel 
(2002), and Weynant and Olavson (1999). To a large extent this literature deals with how to 
introduce ETC and/or ITC into simulation models in an appropriate way. Major obstacles to 
overcome include how to model the spill-over effects and, in particular, effects associated 
with learning-by-doing and learning-by-using. These effects are generic to most R&D, and 
therefore will not be in the focus of the present paper. To some extent the work above builds 
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on an older literature that examines the impact on technological change from different policy 
instruments, e.g., Milliam and Prince (1989), McHugh (1985), Magat (1979), and Orr (1976). 
A more recent study which has gained attention in this field is Montgomery and Smith (2007), 
who paint a somewhat grim picture on the possibilities of achieving technological change 
through emission taxes or a cap-and-trade regime. They claim the problem lies in a dynamic 
inconsistency following from the government being unable to commit to a stringent future 
policy. In order to spur research activities the (future) price of emissions must be high, since 
this creates a demand for new technology capable of reducing emissions. The government 
must therefore declare a high tax level to be valid in the future, i.e., when the new technology 
is available, in order to stimulate research. However, once the innovation is implemented, the 
government has an incentive to set the tax to a level below that declared. The reason is that 
the government, to minimize deadweight losses, would strive to set the tax such that the 
marginal cost of abatement equals the marginal benefit from abatement. That tax rate is 
typically too low to recover the development costs, which at this stage has already been sunk. 
This situation is likely to be anticipated by the developer who, knowing that there is a risk of 
not being able to recover R&D-costs, will not invest in R&D (or invest less than socially 
desirable). A similar problem is analyzed by Kremer (2000) for the case of research on 
vaccines for malaria, HIV and tuberculosis. A plausible analogous behaviour in the cap-and-
trade case would entail the government setting a stringent cap to provide research incentives 
but, once the research has resulted in new technology, the cap will be relaxed, see Alfsen and 
Eskeland (2007).  
The present paper focuses on the specific influence from a cap-and-trade regime on R&D 
investment using a similar set-up as Montgomery and Smith (2007). In particular, we study a 
case with distinct ex ante (before the R&D investment decision) and ex post (after the 
investment has resulted in new technology) stages. Certain attention is paid to the penetration 
rate of the new technology. In the present paper, emitters differ with respect to the costs 
associated with switching from old to new technology. It is then not necessarily the case that 
all emitting firms should adopt a new technology even from a social welfare perspective. We 
will show that the penetration rate depends on the cap-and-trade regime and how it is 
expected to be calibrated in response to new technology becoming available. The approach 
has similarities to Barret (2006), which also addresses penetration rates but in the form of the 
number of countries choosing to adopt a technology treaty. 
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The remaining paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and discusses both 
the market outcome and a social planner benchmark. Section 3 contains a discussion about 
policy recommendations following from the model. Finally, concluding remarks are given in 
section 4. 
2. The model 
The model contains several sequential steps as illustrated in Figure 1. First, the policy maker 
decides on a cap after which a developer decides on whether to invest in research, which will 
(deterministically) result in an innovation that reduces the costs of abatements. If the 
investment is made, the developer determines a price for the new product. We assume that the 
product is protected by a patent (or similar) such that the developer has monopoly power. 
Given the price, the emitters in the economy choose whether or not to buy the innovation. If 
they do, their abatement costs will decrease and, thus, they will emit less given that they are 
regulated by a cap-and-trade regime. If some emitters reduce their emissions there will be (1) 
a reallocation of abatements between emitters in the economy and (2) a reduction in the 
market price for emission permits. As the model is deterministic and all agents are rational, 
the impact of the introduction of the innovation, and how it is priced, on the market for 
emission permits will be taken into account both by the emitters in their choice whether to 
invest in the innovation and by the developer when deciding on whether to invest in research. 
 
 
Figure 1, Illustration of the sequential steps of the model 
The two stages in Figure 1 that regard the policy maker’s behaviour, stage 1) and 5), will be 
addressed in a later section. Here we derive a model in which the government is passive in the 
sense that it decides on a cap in the ex ante stage, i.e., before the research decision is made, 
that will be valid also for the ex post stage. 
 Time 
1) Policy maker 
sets cap 
 
3) Developer set 
technology price, PD 
5) (Policy maker 
may calibrate cap) 
2) Developer decides 
on R&D investment 
6) Firms emit and 
trade in permits, at 
price PP 
4) Firms choose 
whether to buy new 
technology 
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We start by solving the last stage of the game, labelled 6) in Figure 1, in which the firms trade 
in emission permits. Assume total abatement costs to be quadratic in abatements. Given that a 
firm i uses the old technology its marginal abatement cost is given by 
MACO = g – b Ei ∀i using the old technology  (1) 
Where MACO is the marginal abatement cost (O for ‘old’), Ei is the amount of emissions by 
firm i, and g and b are positive parameters. If the new technology is used it will reduce the 
cost of abatement. A simple way to capture this, which also results in a readily interpretable 
model, is to let the new technology shift the marginal abatement cost function (MAC) to a 
lower level. Thus, if the innovation is installed by firm j this results in a MACD-function (D 
for ‘developed’) as 
MACD = d – b Ej ∀j using the new technology  (2) 
Where d is a positive parameter. As the new technology reduces abatement costs, d < g. 
A firm’s emissions will be such that the marginal abatement cost equals the permit price, Pp. 
Thus, a firm that utilizes the old technology will emit EO = (g - Pp) / b units of emissions 
while a firm that has adopted the new technology will emit ED = (d - Pp) / b units. 
Normalizing the number of firms to one and denoting the share of emitters who adopts the 












= )1(     (3) 
Under a cap-and-trade regime total emissions are given by the number of permits issued. 
Denote this cap totE . The implementation of new technology, if the cap is not changed, will 
influence the permit price rather than totE . To capture this, we rearrange (3) as 
totp EbgnndP −−+= )1(      (4) 
Simple inspection of (4) yields the expected characteristics that the price decreases in the 
number of emission permits allocated to the market. It is also affected by d, g and b; the lower 
(through d and g) and/or steeper (through b) the marginal abatement cost functions are, the 
lower the permit price. The permit price decreases in the share of emitters adopting the new 
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technology as this corresponds to a higher value of n which will put more weight on d relative 
to g. 
We now turn to stage 4) where the firms decide on whether or not to adopt the new 
technology, and thus leave the government’s choice in stage 5) until later. We start by noting 
that a firm’s total cost from the cap-and-trade regime comprises two parts. Firstly, the cost of 
permits for emissions made. For firm i, this is given by Pp Ei. Secondly, the cost of 
conducting the abatements, which, under the assumptions used, amounts to (BAUi – Ei) Pp / 2, 
where BAUi denotes firm i’s business as usual emissions level, i.e., the level chosen in the 









=      (5) 
This is the cost a firm will incur from being subject to the cap-and-trade regime given that it 
behaves optimally when choosing its emissions/abatement level and given that it does not 
adopt the new technology. A similar expression (only differing by containing d rather than g) 
may be derived for a firm that has adopted the new technology.  
Switching technology is costly. Firstly, purchasing the technology is associated with a 
(positive) price. Assuming that the developer cannot price discriminate, all firms face the 
same price for purchasing the technology, denoted PD. Secondly, there may be costs 
associated with switching from the old technology to the new and these may differ between 
firms. To capture this we use an approach similar to the famous Hotelling’s (1929) linear city. 
Let the firms be uniformly distributed on a line ranging from zero to one. Let a particular firm 
i be located on point i on the line. By assuming that the switching cost is zero for a firm in 
point zero, and increasing in a linear fashion the further away from zero a firm is located, we 
may capture the switching cost by t i. Where t is a non-negative scaling parameter. Adding 
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Firm i will switch technology iff TCD,i ≤ TCO. If it is optimal for a firm in location i to switch 
technology, this must also be the case for all firms at j < i, since the switching cost increases 
in i. 
Let us now turn to stage 3) in the model to examine the developer’s pricing strategy. The 
developer will, given that it has developed the new technology, sell it in a profit maximizing 
manner. Without major influence on generality, we assume that the cost for the developer of 
selling a unit of the technology, given that it already has been developed, is zero. For the 
developer to decide on how many units to provide, which in this setting corresponds to setting 
n, he needs to know at what price the share of firms switching amounts to n. This requires 
finding the firm that is indifferent between switching and keeping the old technology, i.e., the 









=      (7) 
PD is thus the highest price at which a share of the emitters equal to n will buy the new 
technology. The expression in (7) makes intuitive sense; given n, the price that may be 
charged is higher the better the new technology is relative to the old one, i.e., the larger the 
difference between g and d, and the less rapid is the growth in switching cost over distance 
from zero, i.e., the smaller the t is. The price also decreases in b, which follows from that a 
high value of b, given d and g, yields a low business as usual level and hence less abatements 
are needed to reach a given cap.  
An important observation from (7) is that, given n, the optimal price to charge for the 
technology will decrease in the permit price. We know that the more firms that adopt the new 
technology, the lower will the permit price be as these firms will emit less and thus the total 
demand for permits will decrease. Consequently, there is a crucial feed-back effect from the 
adoption of new technology on PD working through the permit market. That is, we must take 
into consideration that the permit price depends on n by substituting Pp in (7) by (4). This 
yields 








    (8) 
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Comparing (8) to (7) we still have the impact from how the switching cost develops, through 
the last term, and that the relative merits of the new technology influences the price, through 
g – d. From (8) we also see that PD decreases in n not only due to the switching cost but also 
through its impact on the permit price, as nd + (1 – n)g decreases in n. Furthermore, PD 
decreases in the total amount of emissions allowed, which also seems intuitively correct. 
Still given that the new technology has been developed, and that it then is associated with zero 
costs to provide, the developer strives to maximize its revenue given by n PD. Thus, after 
multiplying the expression in (8) by n to get an expression for the revenue, we may derive the 











     (9) 
Where subindex D denotes that the n is optimal from the developer’s, but not necessarily the 
society’s, perspective. By substituting for (9) in (8), we achieve an expression for the price the 






* −−=      (10) 
Multiplying (9) and (10) yields the (maximized) revenue 











     (11) 
The first thing to note in (9), (10) and (11) is that totEbg −  is the permit price if all firms use 
the old technology. Both this and g – d is always positive (since the new technology is 
assumed to be better than the old), so all three expressions are positive. It is also noteworthy 
that *Dn  decreases in t, while 
*
DP  does not. That is, a sharper increase in switching cost results 
in that fewer firms switch technology, which seems intuitively correct. However, the price 
charged by the developer is not affected by the switching cost. Consequently, and seen from 
(11), the developer’s revenue is strictly decreasing in t. 
Leaving the decision about the initial cap until the next section, let us briefly address stage 2) 
of the model in which the developer chooses how much to invest in R&D. The relative merit 
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of the new technology as compared to the old one affects (9), (10) and (11). The merit is 
captured by the magnitude of the shift in MAC-function, i.e., g – d. For clarity, let a ≡ g – d. A 
larger a thus implies a larger improvement in technology relative to the old one. From the 
developer’s perspective, g is exogenously given – but the developer can, subject to the R&D 
investment, choose d, and thereby influence a. Substituting for a in (11) and differentiating 
with respect to a yield  
( ) ( )( )22* 2 btaEbgataR tot +−=∂∂     (12) 
Thus, the revenue is strictly increasing in a in optimum
1
. Let I denote the lowest research 
investment needed to achieve a technology which is, roughly speaking, a units better than the 
existing one. For simplicity, assume that I is convex function of a, i.e., I´(a) > 0 and I´´(a) ≥ 0. 
This implies that the research investment needed to improve on the existing technology 
increases in the improvement at an increasing rate. To maximize profit, the developer aims for 
an a such that aRaI ∂∂=′ )( and 22)( aRaI ∂∂>′′ . From (12) we may derive the second 
derivative as ( )( ) ( )( )322222 23 btaEbgabttaR tot +−−=∂∂ , which is positive when 
3bta <  and negative for a larger than that. Thus, the solution, if any, typically contains 
two roots out of which the one associated with the higher a is a maximum. As reducing totE  
increases aR ∂∂  for any given a, we conclude that, given I(a), a more stringent cap results in 
that the maximising root appears at a higher a. That is, a lower totE  (applicable once the 
technology has been developed) implies that the developer will invest more in R&D. 
The socially optimal penetration rate, given the cap and technology 
Above we have studied the incentives for innovation and the developer’s strategy under a cap-
and-trade regime given that the developer has monopoly power. We should expect that the 
new technology may be underprovided in this scenario, since the developer will apply a mark-
up on the price for the technology. Thus, there is most probably an efficiency loss present. As 
                                                 
1
 From (9) and (10), the optimal price increases in a, but the situation is more complex for the optimal n. For low 
values of a, increasing a will result in that the developer would like more firms to switch technology. For larger 
values of a, the opposite applies. The a at which the derivative changes sign depends on how rapidly the 
switching costs increase and how steep the MAC-functions are. 
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a benchmark we will now examine the optimal penetration rate of the technology from a 
social planner’s perspective, given that the research investment has been made and that the 
cap is not changed due to this. That is, we seek the optimal n from the social planner’s 
perspective, denoted *Sn , given d and totE . This is such that the total costs of reaching totE  are 
minimized. These costs consist of two parts; the total abatement costs in the economy and the 
switching costs for all firms that adopt the new technology.
2
 The former is, by design, always 
decreasing in n, i.e., if switching costs are zero all firms should change technology. However, 
this is not necessarily the case if t > 0.  
As above, the abatement cost for firm i is given by (BAUi – Ei) Pp / 2. Substituting for BAUi 
and Ei yields firm i’s abatement cost to be bPp 2/
2  disregarding whether it uses the old or the 
new technology, which is due to the assumption that the technology shifts the MAC-function 
while leaving the slope unaffected. The introduction of new technology will nevertheless 















   (13) 
where the integral captures the switching costs. Differentiating (13) with respect to n yields 











1    (14) 
which clearly illustrates the opposing effects from the impact on switching cost (the first 









*      (15) 
Comparing (15) with (9) shows that *Sn  = 2 
*
Dn . That is, the socially desirable number of 
firms to switch technology is exactly twice as large as what the number would be in the 
market solution. As we have assumed the marginal cost of providing the technology once it is 
                                                 
2
 Costs associated with firms having to surrender allowances to cover their emissions are of no concern here as 
they only constitute a transfer between parties. 
 11 
developed to be constant (at zero) and the maximum price that may be charged is linear in n, 
this is not a very surprising outcome given that the developer is a monopolist. 
One reaches the exact same expression as in (15) simply by looking at what the optimal n 
would be if the technology is provided at marginal cost, in this case zero. Consequently, the 
distortion – in that the outcome under the market solution differs from the social optimal one 
– follows from the mark-up in price by the monopolist only, given that the cap is not 
calibrated due to the introduction of new technology. Even if the assumption regarding zero 
marginal cost is specific, this outcome clearly illustrates the problem as a zero price does not 
yield any incentives for R&D. 
Calibration of the cap and consequences thereof 
As discussed in the introduction, Montgomery and Smith (2007) argue there is a lack of 
incentives for innovation under emissions taxes due to the policy maker’s inability to credibly 
commit to future policies. To examine the corresponding problem in a cap-and-trade setting, 
we need an expression for the abatement benefits as these affect the optimal cap. Assuming 
total abatement benefits to be quadratic in abatements and that the emissions are fully mixed 
we may write the marginal abatement benefits (MAB) as 
totEMAB βα +=      (16) 
where α and β are positive parameters. We may think of three different levels of commitment, 
which will influence the level of the cap. In the one extreme, the policy maker may commit to 
a future cap before the research decision is made, i.e., there is no dynamic inconsistency 
present. In the other extreme, the policy maker cannot commit to any future policy. There is 
also an intermediate level where the policy maker can commit to a future cap before the firms 
chose whether or not to buy the new technology, but after the R&D investment has been 
made. 
When the policy maker cannot commit, the cap will be calibrated after the firms have chosen 
whether to purchase the new technology, i.e., in stage 5 in Figure 1. Then both d and n are 
given and a policy maker striving to maximize the difference between total abatement benefits 
and total abatement costs would set the cap such that MAC = MAB. The same approach as 
used to derive (4) yields a MAC-function given by nd + (1 – n)g – bEtot. Using this, the 










)1(*      (17) 
From (17) it is seen that the optimal cap increases in both d and g, which is intuitively correct 
as this implies higher marginal abatement costs. The optimal cap decreases in α and β, since 
higher α and β imply a higher and steeper marginal abatement benefit function respectively. 
That the optimal cap decreases in b follows from that the business as usual level decreases in 
b and, hence, so does the amount of abatements required to reach the cap. 
The most important observation to be drawn from (17) is that the optimal cap decreases in n 
since a high n puts more weight on d. That is, if new technology is introduced and 
implemented, the optimal response from the policy maker is to calibrate the cap downwards 
and thereby making it more stringent, i.e., the exact opposite to the behaviour under the 
emissions tax discussed above. We should however be clear on the difference between the tax 
and the cap-and-trade case. The government may ‘promise’ a high tax in the future but the 
developer knows this is not a credible commitment and, thus, will not act on it. In the cap-
and-trade case, as we have seen, the developer has no reason to believe that the cap will be 
increased due to new technology, but nevertheless knows that the technology will have a 
negative impact on permit prices
3
. There is thus a parallel between the two systems in that 
both will result in a lower price per emissions after the innovation is implemented, but for 
different reasons. A more direct analogy, also discussed in Montgomery and Smith (2007), 
lies in that the government faces incentives to abolish the patent protection once the new 
technology is in place. This would open up for competition, which would drive prices down to 
marginal cost and, hence, the market solution would coincide with the (ex post) social 
desirable one. Of course, if the developer would anticipate such behaviour, very little would 
be invested in R&D. However, this is a generic problem for all innovations, not only those 
driven by emission regulations and there seems to be no reason to believe that problems 
would be larger in an emission regulation setting than elsewhere. 
                                                 
3
















1 , which is negative. 
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From (9) and (15) we see that whether the government will act optimally, i.e., by decreasing 
the cap as predicted by (17), or not will influence the number of firms that switch technology. 
Table 1 summarizes four different cases by looking at the market outcome versus the social 
outcome both in a situation where the cap is calibrated in accordance with (17) and when it is 
kept at the level that is optimal without the new technology
4
, denoted Optimal Cap and Old 
Cap respectively. 
Table 1, optimal share of switching firms in different scenarios 
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The first thing to note in Table 1 is that * ,
*
, 2 OldDOldS nn = , which is expected as we above 
showed this to be the case for any given value of the cap, not only the (ex ante) optimal one. 
Comparing * ,OldSn  to 
*
,OptSn  shows that the denominator is b(d - g)
2
 larger in the former case. 
The difference in penetration rate under the calibrated and the non-calibrated cap thus 
increases in the slope of the MAC-function and, exponentially, in the relative merits of the 
new technology. There is a similar relationship between * ,OldDn  and 
*
,OptDn  in the market 
outcome. However, in that case the term b(d - g)
2
 is present also in the optimal cap case, but 
its impact is less than under the non-calibrated cap. That is, the number of firms that switches 
technology is larger under the calibrated cap both in the market solution and in the social 
optimum, as in both cases the denominator is larger under the old cap. However, the 
difference is smaller in the market solution. 
                                                 
4
 The Old Cap is thus (g – α)/(b + β) which follows from (17) given n=0, i.e., the new technology is not used. 
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As a consequence, the relative difference between the market and the socially desirable 




, 2 OptDOptS nn > . This is due to the interconnectivity between the number of firms switching 
technology and the optimal cap. That n is higher in the social than in the market solution 
implies the cap to be more stringent in the former case, which, in turn, calls for an even higher 
n in the social optimum. Thus, the reason for an even higher discrepancy between the social 
and the market optimum is that the optimal cap is no longer the same in the two cases. 
This points towards a second source of efficiency loss which, in contrast to the one due to the 
monopolist’s mark-up discussed above, is specific for the cap-and-trade setting. This follows 
from how the policy maker calibrates the cap. We have shown, in (17), that the more firms 
that switch technology, the more stringent should the new cap be. However, there is also a 
causality working in the opposite direction in that the more stringent the cap is, the more firms 
should switch technology. The share of the firms that should switch depends on the marginal 
impact on abatement cost and the marginal switching cost, as seen in (14). Taking into 
account that the cap optimally should be made more stringent, this will increase the permit 
price and, thus, allow for higher abatement costs in optimum. This implies that more firms 
optimally should switch technology when allowing for cap calibration than otherwise, as seen 
in Table 1. 
The same story applies for the market outcome. In particular, the share of switching firms 
should be larger when allowing for calibrations of the cap. The mark-up of the price for the 
technology applied by the monopolistic developer however results in a less than socially 
desirable penetration rate. As a consequence, the increase in permit prices caused by changing 
the cap is less than it should be in a social optimum and, thus, the feed-back from higher 
permit prices into more firms switching firms becomes inefficiently weak. 
It is worth noting that both sources of efficiency loss in the market outcome ultimately are due 
to the monopolistic pricing of the developer. However, one is the standard textbook efficiency 
loss directly associated with monopolistic behaviour while the other is associated with the 
policy maker’s choice of optimal cap being distorted by the mark-up in technology price. 
Let us now address the cap, which unlike n may be directly targeted by the policy maker. The 
optimal cap valid for a given n follows from (17). The penetration rate that will emerge on the 
market follows from the developer’s pricing decision, which in turn depends on the expected 
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cap as specified in (9). Entering (9) into (17) and solving for the cap yields the optimal cap if 
it is to be calibrated after the firms have chosen whether or not to adopt the new technology as 
( )( ) ( )( )














   (18) 
In a situation where the policy maker may calibrate the cap before the firms make their 
investment choices but after the new technology is available, things are different. The policy 
maker may then take into consideration that the (actual, not expected) cap will influence the 
















max    (19) 
Where BAUNEW denotes the business as usual level given the resulting penetration rate and 
BAUOLD the level with no new technology. The first two integrals capture the efficiency gain 
from moving from a total emissions volume equal to BAUOLD to Etot.
 5
 The last integral 
captures the switching cost involved with adopting the new technology. Note that the R&D 
investment is sunk and therefore does not appear in (19). Solving the maximization, taking 
account for that the penetration rate is given by (9), yields 
( )( ) ( )( )














   (20) 
Comparing (18) to (20) reveals that * ,
*
, nBeforetotnAftertot EE > . That is, the policy is less stringent if 
the policy maker takes the new aggregated MAC–function as given, which is the case if both 
the technology and its penetration rate are decided before the cap is calibrated, than otherwise. 
This is an intuitively appealing result as it implies that the policy will be more stringent when 
it does not only influence the abatements directly, but also the penetration rate. 
Finally, as discussed above, the developer will invest in R&D up to the point where the 
additional investment for a marginal improvement in technology equals the increase in 
                                                 
5
 The first integral in (19) captures the gain from the cap-and-trade system’s impact on emissions, given the new 
technology. The second integral captures the efficiency gain from the new technology reducing the business as 
usual level.  
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revenue from the improvement. We have shown that the marginal revenue increases the more 
stringent the policy is, i.e., for lower totE . From this we may conclude that, if the policy 
maker would be able to commit at the ex ante stage on an ex post policy, the optimal policy 
would likely be more stringent than when he cannot commit since this would increase the 
R&D investment. 
3. Discussion; policy implications – what could be done? 
The primary aim of the present paper is to add to the understanding of the link between 
innovation incentives, technology penetration and the cap-and-trade regulation. Even so, the 
model provides some conclusions regarding policy design. We may start by noting that 
several model parameters arguably are outside the policy maker’s control, e.g., the original 
MAC-function, i.e., g and b, and the MAB-function, i.e., α and β. Others may not be directly 
influenced, but may – for instance through subsidies – be indirectly targeted by public policy, 
e.g., the R&D investment and the switching cost. Finally, there is the cap which is the only 
variable in the model directly decided upon by the policy maker. 
Regarding the cap, two questions are of particular interest. First, is it feasible for the policy 
maker to commit to a stringent ex post cap to incentivise more research? Second, has the ex 
ante cap got any impact on innovation incentives? 
The first question is important since the model tells us that both the penetration rate and the 
research investment increase in the permit price, which in turn is higher the more stringent is 
the cap. We have argued that if the policy maker could in a credible (costless) way commit ex 
ante to a stringent policy ex post, it would be optimal to do so. The reason why this will not 
work is the time inconsistency problem noted by Montgomery and Smith (2007) discussed in 
the introduction. That is, a promise about a future cap which is more stringent than the 
optimal one is not credible and, hence, will not influence the developer’s research decision.  
The second question regards potential gains from setting a stringent cap already at the stage 
where the research investment decision is made (ex ante). This would increase the permit 
price, which potentially could provide a signal to the developer to invest in research. 
However, only the (expected) permit price when the new technology has been implemented 
affects the research decision – and a high ex ante permit price will not make a commitment to 
a high ex post price any more credible. 
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Things may be different if we allow ourselves to divert from the simple setting where all 
agents are fully informed. Consider a case where the localisation of the MAB-function, α, is 
known by the policy maker only (or, at least, the policy maker is better informed about it). A 
stringent ex ante cap signals to the market participants, including the developer, that α is high. 
If α is high, the optimal policy in the ex post stage also includes a stringent cap and, thus, the 
signal will result in that the developer invests more in research than otherwise. This reasoning 
suggests that the policy maker may induce more research by setting an inefficiently stringent 
ex ante cap. However, the developer will probably understand the policy maker’s incentives 
and not respond fully to the initial price. The model presented above is not suited to capture 
this, but it does not seem unlikely that the policy maker’s ability to ‘trick’ the developer into 
conducting more research in this way results in an even worse outcome. However, we leave 
this question open for future research. 
Thus far we have concluded that the (ex post) cap is important for the level of research and 
the penetration level of new technology, but also that the policy maker’s ability to use the cap 
to incentivise innovations in a credible way is limited. Let us briefly discuss other 
instruments, in particular subsidies aimed either to decrease the research investment being 
carried by the developer or the switching cost carried by the firm. 
R&D subsidies are associated with several problems, e.g., related to rent seeking and moral 
hazard, not captured by the model above. Nevertheless, the model provides some valuable 
insights. We have argued that the developer will chose a research level such that 
aRaI ∂∂=∂∂ , i.e., the additional investment required for a marginal improvement of the 
technology must equal the additional revenue raised from the marginal improvement. As 
discussed, the marginal revenue depends on the cap. Given a cap, a subsidy that decreases the 
developer’s (marginal) investment cost, ∂I / ∂a, may thus result in a more efficient research 
level. One interesting outcome of the model is that such a subsidy will not decrease the price 
of the technology. Another observation is that, given that a subsidy has resulted in a larger a, 
there is still a discrepancy in penetration rate between the market solution and the social 
optimum – since in both cases a larger a should lead to a higher penetration rate. 
Finally, the policy maker could subsidize the switching cost through paying part of the cost 
firms incur from adopting the new technology. From equations (12) to (14) we know that a 
subsidy designed to decrease t will increase the penetration rate. It will however not decrease 
the price charged by the developer who, consequently, will gain from increased revenues. 
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This will justify a larger investment in R&D and, once the new technology is implemented, 
this calls for a more stringent cap. As above, however, given the technology there will still be 
a discrepancy between the market outcome and the social optimum. 
4. Concluding remarks 
The present paper presents a model containing a developer who, if he develops a new 
technology, will be able to exercise monopoly power. As the developer then will charge a 
price above marginal cost, the share of firms adopting the new technology will be less than 
socially desirable. These effects are expected and typical consequences of a seller having 
market power. In the present context the situation is however further complicated due to the 
market ultimately being driven by a political decision regarding the cap, i.e., the total 
emission volume allowed. 
We have shown that there is a crucial feedback between the R&D investment, the market 
price for the new technology, the market price for emission permits and the potential 
calibration of the cap once new technology has been implemented. In short, the introduction 
of new technology that reduces the costs of abatements will decrease the market clearing 
permit price. As a lower permit price reduces the demand for the new technology, this is bad – 
but expected – news for the developer. However, reduced abatement costs will lead an 
efficiency concerned policy maker to calibrate the cap; making it more stringent. This 
increases permit prices and, in turn, demand, and hence the price, for the new technology. 
There are differences between the cap-and-trade setting, as addressed here, and the emissions 
tax setting, as addressed in, e.g., Montgomery and Smith (2007). In the latter case, the 
introduction of new technology results in the policy maker having incentives to relax the 
policy by reducing the tax level, while in the cap-and-trade setting the opposite applies as the 
policy maker should lower the cap, i.e., implement a more stringent policy, as a response to 
new technology. However, the end results are similar; in both cases the price for emissions is 
reduced (even though the cap is lower) while total emissions are lower after the introduction 
of new technology. Another important difference between the analysis in the present paper 
and Montgomery and Smith lies in the monopoly power granted through the patent. This 
allows the developer to receive a greater surplus to recover the R&D investment, but also 
creates problems such as a low penetration rate. 
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Thus, the emissions cap and how it is calibrated in response to the introduction of new 
technology clearly influences the R&D decisions. This leads to the question whether the 
policy maker could use the cap to counter the problem of – from a social welfare perspective 
– low R&D investment and technology penetration. The conclusions we draw is that the 
possibility for this is very limited. This follows from the policy maker’s inability to credibly 
commit to a future cap that is stringent enough to motivate an efficient level of R&D efforts. 
In the absence of some mechanism that resolves the dynamic inconsistency problem; 
additional policy instruments targeted towards R&D and/or adaptation of technologies that 
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